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Background
The EU has been talking about increasing the cooperation between the 
research community and society (EU, 2006), the drive towards the knowledge 
based society (EU, 2003) and other initiatives, intended to make Knowledge the 
basis of the EU economy. 
However the EU has significant traditional sectors, with little or no R&D 
performed in the firms in the sector. These sectors may have research performed in 
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Abstract
The article shows that in firms with high R&D concentration management 
involvement in R&D issues is high. That involvement shows that the management team 
has a crucial part in the role of R&D in these firms. It requires that the management 
develop the skills and intuition required to deal with R&D issues in addition to the 
internal routines in the firms. In low R&D concentration firms that requirement does 
not exist.  The environment does not encourage the wasteful practice of developing 
unnecessary   skills.   However,   when   moving   firms   from   the   Low   end   of   R&D 
concentration to the High end, in parallel to the development of the required internal 
routines, and the creation of the infrastructure, new skills have to be developed in the 
management team.
Further, the article shows that firms with high R&D concentration involved in 
Collaborative research tend to copy management organs and routines from their 
structure to the consortia they form. This tendency presents another difficulty for firms 
with low R&D concentration when they come to join such consortia or programs. 
As this is only a preliminary research  into these aspects as they are 
demonstrated   in   collaborative   research   consortia,   the   article   ends   with 
recommendations for future research.research organizations, or in some firms that supply the results on the form of 
machines or processes to the rest of the sector members. These sectors (e.g. wood, 
furniture, jewelry) find it difficult to accept the drive for innovation in order to 
improve their competitiveness as they are traditionally used to compete on quality, 
price service or similar, and performing research and development is alien to them. 
When compared with firms which perform R&D as part of their regular activity 
(e.g. the High-Tech sectors) the traditional sectors show different organizational 
aspects.
The firms with high R&D concentration live in the technological world, 
which has its own characteristics influencing their structure and routines. The 
technological world is getting more competitive (Kaiser, 2000) the ever-shortening 
product life cycle, and the technological revolutions are placing increasingly heavy 
demands on the development departments of the industry.  
The environment is becoming more and more complex as presented by 
Brown and Eisenhardt (1998), in their definition of Co-Opetitors - describing the 
interesting enemy – friend relationships that complicate the commercial scenery. 
This complication in the working environment of the firms with high R&D 
concentration is further  enhanced  when considering the involvement  of  the 
research organizations and the government. When in their 1997 article Etzkowitz, 
& Leydersdorrf presented this complex relationship as the “Triple Helix” their 
selection of the name referred not only to its fundamental role (such as the double 
helix of the DNA), but also to the intertwining and complexity derived from it.
The cooperation between industry and academy in large consortia for 
generic technology development while the firms involved keep competing in the 
market place is relatively new. In both major areas for such cooperation, the US 
and the EU, that type of cooperation was forbidden in the past. Only since 1984 in 
the USA
1 and 1985 in the EU (Miyagiwa and Ohno, 2002) have the law restricting 
such cooperation been lifted. The change allowed governments to actively support 
such activities, which were considered a potential boost to economic development, 
and encouraged research into the economic nature of this activity with numerous 
models  (Katz, 1986;  D’Aspremont,  & Jacquemin,  1988;  Kamien, Miller, and 
Zang, 1992; Laredo, 1998; Pastor & Sandonis, 2002), The literature also focused 
on different players (, Rosenberg, 1990; Lukkonnen, 1988), as well as different 
disciplines such as social and organizational theories (Thursby,  Thursby,  & 
Mukherjee, 2005; Stern & Pozner, 2007)   ending with more complex models 
presented later (Doz, Olk, & Ring, 2000; Porath, 2008). 
While this research activity looked at both the function and the structure of 
the consortia, there was never any doubt as to the importance it held for the 
participants. Therefore it was expected that the management of firms in that world 
would tends to be familiar with R&D and monitor it closely. As the R&D, like 
marketing, purchasing has become an interface with the external world, and not 
just an internal procedure, the management attention and involvement became 
more important. 
1 The USA National Cooperation Act of 1984
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this is not the case. R&D is not an interface with the world, it is not part of the 
competition / cooperation network of the business and therefore the management 
would not be required to show any expertise in that field. In fact, due to the low 
concentration of R&D, any management involvement or expertise development can 
be seen as a waste of resources.  
However, when trying to introduce the firms with low R&D concentration 
in the R&D game, and especially into the collaborative research (more complex) 
segment of that world, the management can be often caught off-guard without  the 
preparation to deal with this activity. 
The firms with high R&D concentration would ne interested in the success 
of the collaborative research and as they are familiar with the management 
involvement mode of operation would seek to copy that into the consortia they 
were forming. For the firms with low R&D concentration this unfamiliar structure 




Considering the above, the research question is: Does the management 
involvement in firms with high R&D concentration also influence the structure of 
R&D consortia they form?
This could be translated into working hypotheses:
1. Firms   with   high   R&D   concentration   will   show   management 
involvement in R&D related decisions;
2. Firms with high R&D concentration will tend to form management 
organs and routines similar to their won when forming R&D consortia.
In order to verify the involvement of management in firms with high R&D 
concentration, and their tendencies I used the results of the research described 
below. That research dealt more generally with consortia forming mechanisms, but 
the decision making regarding the formation in the firms joining, and the resulting 
structure of the consortia formed, were part of the research scope.
Instrument
The questionnaire employed was an adaptation of a validated questionnaire 
from   the   research   performed   by   Dyer   and   Nobeoka   (2000).   The   original 
questionnaire was relevant to consortia registered in the US. These consortia were 
organized voluntarily without any government funding and therefore had a free 
structure, with no compulsory institutional structure or by-laws. As the consortia 
researched here were financed by the government and were under a structured 
Review of International Comparative Management                      Volume 10, Issue 2, May  2009program this required some adaptation of the questionnaire to relate to the specific 
circumstances of the projects, the main parameters however, remained unchanged. 
The questionnaire relates to several stages in the consortium life cycle: the 
circumstances leading to the establishment of such an entity, the role or potential 
role of certain functions the structure and function of the resulting consortium, and 
the expectations from such an activity.
Population
The primary data were derived from the questionnaire and supplemented 
by interviews for clarification and refining of viewpoints. The population is 
comprised of firms applying to the Israeli Magnet Program (Porath, 2004) as well 
as those that are participating in or veterans of its projects. To date, the Magnet 
Program has initiated 37 projects, 11 of which are currently ongoing. They cover 
most of the industrial areas existing in Israel, from agriculture to medicine and 
from materials to communications and general software platforms. On average, 
Magnet issues calls for formation of consortia for proposing new projects at least 
three times per year (4 in 2003 and 5 in 2004). Firms that have participated in kick-
off meetings are also among the population examined as veterans of successful and 
failing proposals. The entire population of such firms is relatively small, as it is a 
sub-section of firms seeking government support that is not overly large, because 
of the limitations imposed by the R&D Law, which are a major deterrent to seeking 
such help, and because of the small number of firms in that group that are large 
enough to deal with generic research (a maximum of 30% generic R&D is allowed 
per firm). Since the program targets long-term research, this reduces the number of 
firms that are involved or are ready to be involved (Porath, 2004). 
The questionnaire targets firm managers and project managers who were 
involved in the process of making the decision to join the consortium and have 
experience of its operation and functioning. 
Methodology
Ninety-seven questionnaires were received out of 220 sent or handed out at 
various meetings of Magnet consortia; a 44.1% response rate. The responses came 
from 20 of the 33 Magnet projects (60%) existing at the end of data collection (end 
of 2005). Since the beginning of the program, firms have merged and split, some 
have disappeared completely, or the relevant personnel could not be tracked down. 
The   gathering   of   information   by   mail   showed   little   response   despite   the 
introduction letter by the program director; personal collection via meetings or e-
mail following meetings and phone calls proved the most efficient. The sample was 
therefore comprised of managers of projects, firms’ representatives, and CEOs 
with actual first-hand acquaintance or interest in the program. Most had previous 
experience but some were newcomers to the program.
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specific needs of the analysis. The results section presents the questions answered 
and analyzed. 
Results 
The results regarding the involvement of management levels involved in 
approving the participation in the project , and regarding the expected structure of 
the consortium management.
Questions regarding decision making (join the consortium)
Question 8 referred to deciding on joining the consortium - Forming a 





Will you form a committee?  64.8% 35.2%
As can be seen, in most firms the decision to enter a consortium would 
follow the evaluation work of a committee, an indication of the multi-departmental 
effort expected of such a decision.
The questionnaire asked (question 20) how many management levels 
would be required for approval of participation in the organization? The answers 
varied between 1 and 3 with 2 getting 56.0% of the answers.
Q20 statistics
Table 2
Item Mean Median Mode SD
Two levels of management 1.87 2.00 2 0.655
It is important to bear in mind that these firms are high concentration R&D 
firms, some large international firms and some medium size. There were no early 
stage start-ups, as the regulation of the Israeli Magnet program demand that the 
firms participating would invest more than 30% of their R&D budget on the 
generic project. Therefore the firms involved would have more than one or two 
management levels. In most cases the minimal management level required for 
approval would be the Vice President for R&D. 
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The results regarding the management  expectations and the type  of 
management structure to be established were as follows:
Statistics
Table 3 – Q12–13 
Item Yes No
Will the consortium have a board? 84.9% 15.1%
Will the consortium have technical committees? 97.9% 2.1%
Discussion and conclusions
The results above show with high clarity that 2 levels of management were 
normally involved in the decision making regarding the firms involvement in the 
consortium and that these in most cases followed the work and evaluation 
(recommendation) of an interdisciplinary committee.
Such routines are indications of the seriousness the management views the 
involvement in such activities and the internal routines and expertise required to 
make them. The results in this preliminary research into the comparison in the 
management skills regarding R&D management capabilities between the high 
R&D concentrations firms and the low R&D concentration firms, would indicate 
although the hypotheses proposed above were supported, a more thorough, in depth 
research should follow. The involvement of the management presented above is 
beyond the economic size of the budgets compared to the normal business some of 
them do yearly
2. 
The involvement of the management supports the view that in the high 
R&D concentration sectors the R&D is viewed as a strategic activity and merits the 
involvement of the management. This highlights the difference between the high 
R&D concentration firms and the low in that aspect.
On the indication of the resulting management structure in the consortium 
it would appear that the firms view the structure as important enough to keep a 
similar structure to the one they employ internally. They board and technical 
committee would allow theses firms to work in a familiar environment when 
coming to the management of an R&D activity. 
These two points, the management involvement and skills and the structure 
of R&D collaborative research consortia, would indicate some of the difficulties 
low R&D concentration firms encounter when trying to integrate themselves into 
the high R&D concentration world. Convincing these firms to join R&D consortia 
would create internal, managerial and other problems that may in time lead to 
dissatisfaction and thus to these firms turning away from that direction. These 
2  Some of the Israeli multi-national firms selling hundreds of millions of US$ a year participated in 
the projects, which could not be more than a few single percent of their annual sales.
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due to their lack of ability to integrate they get out of it, less than others.
It may be useful for program managers, interested in integrating such low 
R&D concentration firms to create management support activities to supplement 
the R&D activity. These activities would allow the management in the low R&D 
concentration firms to develop the routines, experience and outlook and support 
their teams in the consortia.  If that could be achieved, and the firms would feel 
that they get out of the R&D consortia activity as much as the other firms, it may 
lead   to   increased   participation,   and   also   to   increased   R&D.   Such   training, 
mentoring or other assistive activities are relatively easy to plan. 
The research presented above is part of a larger research into the formation 
of R&D consortia under structured programs. The data collected for the formation 
mechanism research was wide enough to allow some additional analysis into the 
expected management structure, in addition to the analysis of the decision making 
process in the firms regarding joining the consortia.  However, as these two topics 
where not the focus of the research regarding the management and the research 
questions mentioned here, the analysis cannot be complete. The research question 
and the hypotheses mentioned here were supported, and can be used for further 
research as described below,
Limitations to the research
The most obvious limitation to the research mentioned here are the small 
sample of firms involved and the lack of a control group.  It would however, be 
very difficult to create a comparative group of low-intensity R&D firms and check 
the involvement of the management in R&D. 
Two additional limitations regarding the sample arise – one is the firm 
size. the firms were not controlled regarding size, and therefore the size may have 
some influence in the involvement of the management. However, as many of the 
firms were at least medium in size that would be a small concern. 
Another limitation is the scope of sectors that were covered. Only few 
sectors were covered and some  of them only in a very limited way (e.g. 
pharmaceuticals). The results therefore may have been indicative of the few sectors 
investigated and not as general as claimed. While that could not be helped due to 
the structure of the program investigated and the country it operates in, this is also 
not the case, as the results show that there is very high similarity in attitudes 
between the different sectors in that regard.
Future research
A larger sample of firms from different High-intensity R&D sectors may 
present some  differences in the management  involvement  and the resulting 
preference as to the management structure of R&D consortia. The research should 
also include a size division so as to see if the relative size of the R&D budget to the 
firm’s economic activities merits the involvement due to the economic aspect.
Review of International Comparative Management                      Volume 10, Issue 2, May  2009Further empirical research is required (Fontana, Geuna, & Matt, 2006), 
including investigation into several of the interesting sectorial characteristics that 
emerged in this research. Even if only to remove any doubts regarding differences 
between high R&D concentration sectors.
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